ELCE 2013
- Secure Embedded Linux Product (A Success Story)

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About me

• Marcin Bis

• Entrepreneur

• Embedded Linux: system development, kernel development.

• Esp. Linux + Real-Time - automation (industrial- and home-).
I want to tell you about a success story...  
...protecting added value in a product.

- A few quick words about security
  - Embedded security.
  - Attack vector and surface.
  - What is similar with standard system security?

- Practical example - secured embedded Linux system.
  - A problem (business view).
  - Active & passive security.
  - Examples.

I will not talk about:

- Android

- Web apps, dedicated apps, cloud.
Attack surface

One or more input methods of the system.

- which can be accessed by untrusted user,
- or access to which can be influenced.

![Image of a circuit board with labeled input methods: network, USB, serial, flash, those pins]
Attack vector

...to exploit a surface. Common ones:

- network (TCP/IP, Wi-Fi),
- application,
- serial port.

Less obvious:

- USB,
- I2C,
- solid state memory (FLASH),
- Bluetooth
- GPS, cellular network.

Less obvious == mode dangerous.
Embedded vs. standard

Some differences:

• Some attack vectors are unique to embedded devices.
• Problematic updates (software monoculture).
• People do not threat them as devices.

On the other hand - same programs and services.

(Wireless) network accessible.

Apache, openssh, perl, avahi, dns, openssl etc.
Some examples

- Stuxnet
- FTP access to / via root account.
- admin:default - common in network devices.
- Another example of hard-coded credentials:
Make it secure (trivia)

Common methods are easy to avoid:

- Restricted shell access, eg. serial port
  - strong password,
  - use PAM to auto-logout idle shells.
- Other access methods to shell (web shell, ssh, telnet (!) etc.)
- Strong passwords (+1).
- Do not run all applications from root account.
- Bug-fix-ed components.
- Self developed vs. standard software.
  - Defensive programming.
Passive security
How the customer see the product?

Added Value

Free Software | Open Source
How my customer see the product?

• Hardware becomes cheaper and cheaper.
• Expectations increases (let’s add functionality).
• Linux and open source is a foundation of the software product.
• Open-Source and Free Software gives us all freedom:
  • Every developer has the same rights.
  • And equal chances.
• Customer will make money on added value
  • According to licences of course:
    • GPL
    • LGPL
    • BSD
Added value?

Passive security

A problem?
How to secure a added value?

- possibility of "TiVo-lization", - do not go to far.
- GPLv3
Let’s do it!

At first:

- Nothing will stop user (abuser) from de-soldering an element and trying to analyze logic states.
- Most SoC-s has hundreds of pins - it is difficult (but not impossible).

It all depends on how determined you are ($$$).

Security is a process not a product.
Hardware methods

• BGP - it is harder to analyze data on bus,
• inner layers of PCB are harder to access,
• of using Application processor and external uC - add some logic to check timing (like watchdog).
• TPM chips.
(Wikipedia)
Hidden Via (3)

(Wikipedia)
(Wikipedia)
The problem...

- It is not easy to debug firmware.
Let’s secure data

• Sign it.
  • TPM
  • HAB
• or encrypt it
  • Should be fast.
  • Performance penalty (esp. Real-Time).
  • Where to store the key.

Diagram:
- Key stored somewhere there
- Kernel
- DTB
- initrd
- rootfs (encrypted)
How to encrypt rootfs

Block devices (e.g. eMMC):

- dm-crypt
- `man cryptsetup`
- LUKS

Any filesystem

- ecryptfs
- `sudo mount -t ecryptfs tmp1 tmp2`
- problems using on rootfs (pivot_root, switch_root)
- still, can be used to encrypt parts of filesystem.

Customer wants to have a raw NAND device (wear leveling).
How does it work?

Block device

NAND

FTL

NAND

eraseblock  eraseblock  eraseblock  eraseblock  eraseblock
### NAND

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>B1</th>
<th>C1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>B2</th>
<th>B3</th>
<th>C3</th>
<th>BAD</th>
<th>A5</th>
<th>A6</th>
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Passive security

A problem?
UBI is nice... for big NANDs:

http://elinux.org/Flash_Filesystem_Benchmarks

How to add encryption?

- It can emulate block device.
- Use ecryptfs.
- Look at the source code.

UBIFS already compresses data it writes. Maybe it could encrypt it too.

- Using Crypto-API.
This patch adds a function to perform AES encryption. The compress and decompress routines use this function if they are called with a non-NULL key parameter. It uses AES counter mode (where encryption and decryption are the same function) and performs the operation in place on the data. It uses a default IV of 0, since each key is only ever used to encrypt one data item the IV does not matter.

The const qualifier was removed from the decompress routine for the following reason. Encrypted data is not compressable, so compression is first applied then the result is encrypted. In the reverse, decryption is first applied and the result decompressed. This means that either the input buffer for decompression is used to perform an in-place decryption before decompression, or a third buffer is added and data is copied around.

Signed-off-by: Joel Reardon <reardonj_at_inf.ethz.ch>
---
  fs/ubifs/compress.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  fs/ubifs/ubifs.h   | 12 +++++++-
2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Support for the DCP engine

CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_DCP:

Say 'Y' here to use the DCP AES and SHA engine for the CryptoAPI algorithms.

To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module will be called fsl-dcp.

Symbol: CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_DCP [=y]
Type : tristate
Prompt: Support for the DCP engine
Location:
  -> Device Drivers
  -> Staging drivers (STAGING [=y])
  Defined at drivers/staging/crypto/Kconfig:1
Use proper block cipher

openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -k "secret" -in logo.ppm -out out.ppm
Secured device

The problem of storing encryption key - still exists.
Secured device...

The problem of storing encryption key - still exists.

- Put it as DT attribute.
- Modify NAND driver to use it.

Encrypt kernel+DT using functions of the Chip.

i.MX28 SecureBoot
What is important?

Security is not a **product**.

It is a **process**.

What else?

Internal attacks.

I do not even trust myself.

Questions?